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Adverse Possession of Severable Minerals
Wnajim B. STOEBUCK*
The subject of adverse possession is attended by such mystery
that one might think it traceable to the druidic rather than late
medieval period of English history.' Existence of this mystery,
needless as it may be, makes it worthwhile for any article on ad-
verse possession to commence by establishing some basic concepts.
Foremost among these is that, as understood today, adverse pos-
session of another's land for the period of the statute limiting his
right to recover it not only bars his remedy but creates in the
disseisor an original title in fee simple. Thus, adverse possession
gives the wrongful possessor both a defense and a cause of action.
Implicit in what has been said is another concept. The doctrine
of adverse possession breaks down into two elements: a statutory
limitation on actions to recover land and the principle, usually
supplied by judicial decision, that the statutes are run only by
possession that is "adverse" to the true owner.' Most questions are
concerned with whether certain acts on or with respect to another's
land are "adverse." These questions are tested by reference to the
defining formula for "adverse," which usually runs "actual, open,
notorious, exclusive, continuous, and hostile." The incantation
varies from state to state and from case to case within a given
state, apparently with equal magical power. Some opinions add
the element "claim of right" or "claim of title." Occasionally, after
they have said everything else, courts have added "adverse"; it
hardly can be denied that this closes whatever gaps an already re-
dundant definition may have left.
Considering now some characteristics of minerals, no attempt
will be made to list all the methods by which ownership of minerals
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver.
1 The origins of modem adverse possession are to be found in the limita-
tions on possessory actions for land. Before 1237 the plaintiff under a writ of
right had to show he was seised no earlier than the day in 1135 when Henry
I died. Later the time was set as Henry II's coronation day in 1154 then
Richard I's coronation day in 1189. During this period limitations would bar
the remedy but were not thought of as creating a right in the disseisor. 2 POL-
LOCK & MArrLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 81 (1895).
246 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 709-10 (1958 with 1965 Supp.); 5 THOMP-
SON, REAL PROPERTY 501-04 (1957 Repl. Vol.); 5 TIFFANY, REAT PROPERTY
406-08 (3d ed. 1939). [ 274
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may be severed from ownership of the surface nor to explore the
legal problems attendant upon severance except as they may direct-
ly relate to adverse possession. Suffice it to say, the title to minerals
may be severed, certainly by grant or exception in a deed, and
also by a contract of sale or, at least in states where is it regarded
as a corporeal estate, by a mineral lease.3 Once there has been a
severance, surface and minerals become separate estates, as distinct
as different parcels of land, as some cases put it.4 The term
"minerals" includes not only solid substances like coal, stone, clay
and ores, but also oil and gas.5
Whether minerals are severed or not, the general principles of
the law of adverse possession are applied, just as if minerals were
not involved.6 In this article these general principles are not the
focus of attention but will be stated and used as needed, though
secondary authorities will be cited for them. The problems of
primary interest here arise, not from the existence or quality of the
principles, but from their application in light of the peculiar nature
of minerals and mineral interests. In analyzing these problems, the
principal distinction which must be made is whether minerals are
severed or unsevered; this dichotomy is the framework for what
follows.
BEGUN BEiomu SEVmiaNCE
No severance at any time. If no severance of minerals is in-
volved, that is, if there is no sufficient proof minerals and surface
3 Williams & Meyers, Adverse Possession and Trespass in the Law of Oil
and Gas, 29 RocKY MT. L. REv. 1 (1956). In states allowing a severance by
mineral lease, the estate created is denominated a determinable fee. McElroy,
Adverse Possession of Mineral Estates, 11 BAYLOR L. REv. 253 (1959).4 E.g., Brooke v. Dellinger, 193 Ga. 66, 17 S.E.2d 178 (1941); Jilek v.
Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co., 382 Ill. 241, 47 N.E.2d 96 (1943);
Lyles v. Dodge, 228 S.W. 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Ventro v. Clinclfield
Coal Corp., 199 Va. 943, 103 S.E.2d 254 (1958); Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming
Agency, 63 Wyo. 187, 179 P.2d 773 (1947). The foregoing cases specifically
discuss the severance principle. It is recognized by implied holding or dictum
in most of the cases cited in this article.
IArnett v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 88 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Ky. 1948);
Murray v. Allard, 100 Tenn. 100, 43 S.W. 355 (1897).
'E.g., McBeth v. Wetnight, 57 Ind. App. 47, 106 N.E. 407 (1914);
Vorhes v. Dennison, 300 Ky. 427, 189 S.W.2d 269 (1945); Gordon v. Park,
219 Mo. 600, 117 S.W. 1163 (1909); Vance v. Guy, 223 N.C. 409, 27 S.E.2d
117 (1943); Yoss v. Markley, 34 Ohio Ops. 4, 68 N.E.2d 399 (1946); Hassell
v. Texaco, Inc., 372 P.2d 233 (Okla. 1962); Smith v. Pittston Co., 203 Va.
408, 124 S.E.2d 1 (1962); McCoy v. Lowrie, 42 Wash. 2d 24, 253 P.2d
415 (1953); Thomas v. Young, 93 W. Va. 555, 117 S.E. 909 (1923). No
case has been found that raises the slightest doubt that the general law of
adverse possession applies.
2
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have been severed, acts of adverse possession on the surface con-
stitute adverse possession of all minerals! This is the ordinary case
of adverse possession against an owner whose ownership is a coelo
usque ad centrum. Within this context, two problems have arisen
that, while worth mentioning, do not limit what has been said.
A pair of Pennsylvania cases8 involved tracts of land which had
not been severed by any instrument. Adverse possessors occupied
the surface for the required periods, but at the same time the re-
cord owners were mining minerals. In holding there was no ad-
verse possession of minerals, the court's theory seems to be that
the owners' mining operations worked a kind of severance, to the
end that possession of the surface was not possession of the
"severed" minerals. If there was a severance, certainly possession
of only the surface is not possession of the minerals, in accordance
with the rule to be discussed later. However, one might question
that an owner's mining of his minerals severs the legal interest in
them. The result could better have been reached on the ground
that the alleged adverse possession was not such because not ex-
clusive.
The second problem has to do with use of the surface of un-
severed land for a limited purpose. In one case9 a railroad had
maintained its tracks over the land, and in another'" a school dis-
trict had occupied the surface for school purposes, in each case
for the statutory period. Both courts held that, because of the
limited kinds of uses, there was no adverse possession of minerals.
Clearly, as to the railroad, it did not acquire even title to the sur-
7 Haskins v. Roseberry, 29 F. Supp. 724 (Nev. 1939); Skelly Oil Co. v.
Johnson, 209 Ark. 1107, 194 S.W.2d 425 (1946); Lykes Bros., Inc. v. Mc-
Connel, 115 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1959) (based on doubtful factual conclusion
that deed reserving minerals did not work severance); Bremorst v. Phillips
Coal Co., 202 Iowa 1251, 211 N.W. 898 (1927) (dictum); Hellier Coal &
Coke Co. v. Bowling, 272 S.W. 651 (Ky. 1954); Toth v. Bigelow, 1 N.J.
399, 64 A.2d 62 (1949) (dictum); Payne v. A. M. Fruh Co., 98 N.W.2d 27
(N.D. 1959); Chapman v. Parks, 347 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961);
Interstate Coal & Iron Co. v. Clintwood Coal & Timber Co., 105 Va. 574
54 S.E. 593 (1906); Town of Clenrock v. Abadie, 71 Wyo. 414, 259 P.Acd
766 (1953) (alternate holding based on what seems false logic that plaintiff
could hold paper title to unsevered land and still possess one half of minerals
adversely to itself).
8 Brennan v. Pine Hill Collieries Co., 312 Pa. 52, 167 Ad. 776 (1933);
Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Hughes, 183 Pa. 66, 38 Ad. 568 (1897). See
also 20 VA. L. REv. 120 (1933), which is a note on the Brennan case.
9 Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Garfield Petroleum Corp., 292 Mich. 373, 290
N.W. 833 (1940).
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face but only an easement of passage through prescriptive use."
The school district case may be exceptionable for having over-ex-
tended the doctrine of prescriptive easements, but, having done so,
it does not contravene the rule that possession of the surface is
possession of unsevered minerals. It seems sound enough to say
that acts on the surface which do not give title to the surface do
not give title to minerals.
Severance by owner during running of statute of limitations.
It occasionally happens that adverse possession of the surface com-
mences before there has been a severance. Then, while the statute
of limitations is running, the disseised owner severs the minerals.
In this situation the courts generally hold that the continuing ad-
verse possession of the surface operates against the now severed
minerals. 2 However, there is some authority from West Virginia
to the contrary. Perkins v. Southern Coal Co.,'3 a federal district
court case, relying upon the West Virginia case of Central Trust
Co. v. Harless,'4 held that severance by the owner stopped adverse
possession as to the minerals. This was the result on the facts in
the Harless case, though the court there did not discuss the ques-
tion, nor has any later West Virginia case cited Harless for this
point.
In support of the majority position, it can be said that it is
analogously consistent with a rule of general adverse possession
law. If a future interest is created after adverse possession com-
mences, the possession continues to be adverse to the holder of
the future interest. 5 This is an exception to the normal rule that,
where the future interest was in existence when adverse possession
started, there can be no adversity to the holder of this interest
because he has no present right of possession and the statute limit-
ing possessory actions could not run against him. 6 One reason for
I See RIESTATEMENT, 1TROPERTY § 477 (1940).
12 Hunsley v. Valter, 12 Ill.2d 608, 147 N.E.2d 356 (1958); Finnegan v.
Stineman, 5 Pa. Super. 124 (1897); Broughton v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 105
S.W.2d. 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); McElroy, supra note 3, at 256 (citing
Texas cases).
13 96 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. W. Va. 1951), 54W. VA. L. REv. 76.
14 108 W. Va. 618, 152 S.E. 209 (1930).
's ESTATEM.NT, PaoPERTY § 226 (1940); 3 AmRCAN LAW OF PRop-
ESITY 803-04 (1952); 5 ThomSON, REAL PRoPERTY 589 n.43 (1957 Repl.
Vol.); 4 Tn7ANY, REAL PRoPERTY 453 (3d ed. 1939).
163 A9MCAN LAW OF PROPERTY 761-63 (1952); 5 ThompsoN, REAL
PRoPERTY 589 (1957 Repi. Vol); 4 TwFNruiY, REAL PNopanI7 452-53 (3d ed.
1939).
4
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the exception has been said to be that the future interest holder,
having acquired his interest from a dispossessed owner, takes it
subject to whatever defects existed-in this case the running of
the statute. 7 The exception also has been stated to exist because
it is "essentially fair."1 8 Although the grantee of the future interest
could have discovered the adverse possession by inspecting the
land, he likely would still argue it was not "essentially fair" for
the statute to run against him when he could not stop it by bring-
ing a possessory action.
An argument can be made for the Perkins and Harless cases.
Bearing in mind the two elements of adverse possession-a statute
of limitations plus "adverse" possession-it seems logical that the
statute should not run against one who has no cause of action for
possession. In point of fact, however, there are several instances in
which adverse possession may go on without the owner's having a
possessory cause of action, and vice versa."' Whether this is good
theory, i.e., whether "cause of action" and "adverse possession"
should be equivalents, is a hotly debated and very basic question."0
"Severance" by adverse possessor during running of statute of
limitations. Several cases involve the situation in which the adverse
possessor of the surface, having entered before a severance, exe-
cutes a mineral severance instrument in favor of a grantee who
does not exploit the minerals. The instrument is given before
the grantor has perfected his adverse possession title, and the issue
is whether his continuing adverse possession of the surface inures
to the benefit of the mineral grantee. With the exception of
Tennessee, which has decided to the contrary," those states that
have considered the question have held it does inure to the benefit
of the grantee. Thus, the mineral grantee's title is perfected when
the surface possessor's title is.2 The cases have not supplied
17 3 AmmcAN LAw OF PRoPERTY 803-04 (1952).
,8 RETAT mENT, PRoPERTY § 226 (1940).
19 Some of these are referred to in RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY, Scope Note
to Ch. 15 (1940).
20 A glimpse of this debate can be had by comparing RESTATEMENT,
PRoPERTY § 222 and Scope Note to Ch. 15 (1940), with 3 AmEIcAN LAw
OF PnoPF.RTY 761-63, 765 (1952).
21 Northcut v. Church, 135 Tenn. 541, 188 S.W. 220 (1916), overruling
McBurney v. Glenmary Coal & Coke Co., 121 Tenn. 275, 118 S.W. 694(1909) which had held the surface adverse possession inured to the benefit
of the disseisor's mineral grantee.
22 Pierson v. Case, 272 Ala. 527, 133 So. 2d 239 (1961); American Petro-
fina, Inc. v. Warren, 247 Miss. 552, 156 So. 2d 729 (1963) (alternate hold-
[Vol. 68
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a satisfactory rationale for the majority position, but there is one.
The attempted severance by the adverse possessor is really no
severance, because he then owns no interest which can be severed.
As there is no severance, his continuing adverse possession of the
surface ripens into title in him as to both surface and minerals.
When he thus acquires title, according to a doctrine recognized
in the general law of adverse possession,23 the title relates back
to the time of his entry. Because the original entry occurred before
the execution of the severance instrument, the acquisition of title
validates it, according to the relation-back doctrine. The after-
acquired-title doctrine does not apply, because the adverse pos-
sessor's title is "prior-acquired."
There is a situation explainable by the theory of after-acquired
title. In Tennessee Coal, Iron & Ry. Co. v. Brewer,4 a Fifth Circuit
case involving Alabama law, the adverse possessor of the surface
had given a mineral deed before he entered. The court held his
subsequent adverse possession of the surface inured to the benefit
of his grantee, so as to give the latter title to the minerals. The
doctrine of relation back does not support this result, because
it places title in the grantor at a time after the mineral deed was
given; this of course is the fact pattern invoking the doctrine of
after-acquired title.
BEGuN AFnER SEvERANCE
Basic principles. To begin with, it is established beyond cavil
that, when commenced after the minerals have been severed, no
possession of the surface alone can amount to adverse possession
of the minerals.2" All the cases just cited are ones in which the
in); Temples v. First Natl Bank, 239 Miss. 446, 123 So. 2d 852 (1960);
patrick v. Gulf Prod. Co., 139 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). Compare
the interesting cases of Moore v. Empire Land Co., 181 Ala. 344, 61 So. 940(1913), and Houston Oil Co. v. Moss, 155 Tex. 157, 284 S.W.2d 131 (1955),
3 U.C.L.A. L. RIv. 580 (1956), in which the original adverse possessor of
the surface conveyed the surface, excepting the minerals for himself. The courts
held that his grantee's subsequent adverse possession of the surface inured to
the grantor's benefit as to the minerals.
233 Am.EBicAN LAw OF PROPERTY 829 (1952); 5 THo wsoN, REAL
PRoPERTY 512-13 (1957 Repl. Vol.).
24 92 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1937), 37 MrcH. L. REv. 308 (1938).2s United Fuel Gas Co. v. Dyer, 185 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1950) (West Vir-
ginia law); Sanford v. Alabama Power Co., 256 Ala. 280, 54 So. 2d 562
1951); Buckner v. Wright, 218 Ark. 448, 236 S.W.2d 720 (1951) (dictum);
Skeily Oil Co. v. Johnson, 209 Ark. 1107, 194 S.W.2d 425 (1946); Foss v.
Central Pac. Ry., 9 Cal. App. 2d 117, 49 P.2d 292 (1935); Calvat v. Juhan,119 Colo. 561, 206 P.2d 600 (1949); Jilek v. Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin
Coal Co., 382 IlI. 241, 47 N.E.2d 96 (1943); Jensen v. Sheker, 231 Iowa240, 1 N.W.2d 262 (1941); J. R. Crowe Coal & Mining Co. v. Atkinson, 85
6
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possessor of the surface was the record owner of it, though the
courts state broadly that "adverse" possession of the surface is not
adverse possession of the severed minerals. On the facts, this is a
play on words, because the surface owner, having a legal right to
possess the surface, cannot be said to possess it "adversely" or
"hostilely" to anyone. There simply is for him no adverse possession
of any interest, surface or mineral. It is remarkable that the courts
almost always talk about adverse possession.2" In Kentucky, due to
the language of a statute,2" after severance the surface owner and
possessor is said to be a "trustee" of the minerals for the mineral
owner.28 The Kentucky court regards the "trust" theory as a restate-
ment of the normal rule, and it does not seem to have produced
unusual results, though it may evoke unusual language in some
contexts.
29
Kan. 357, 116 Pac. 499 (1911); Ward v. Woods, 310 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1958);
Arnold v. Stevens, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 106, 35 Am. Dec. 305 (1839); Logsdon
v. Brailer Mining Co., 143 Ind. 463, 123 All. 113 (1923) (apparently dictum);
Cook v. Farley, 195 Miss. 638, 15 So. 2d 352 (1943); Gordon v. Park, 219 Mo.
600, 117 S.W. 1163 (1909) (dictum); Johnson v. Unknown Heirs, 140 Mont.
128, 368 P.2d 577 (1962); Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 N.Y. 538
(1874); Vance v. Pritchard, 213 N.C. 552, 197 S.E. 182 (1938) (dictum);
Wisness v. Paniman, 120 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 1963); Yoss v. Markley, 34 Ohio
Ops. 4, 68 N.E.2d 399 (1946); Viersen v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 133 (Okla.
1963); Murray v. Allard, 100 Tenn. 100, 43 S.W. 355 (1897); Smoot v.
Woods, 363 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Pagel v. Pumphrey, 204
S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Mountain Mission School, Inc., v. White,
204 Va. 256, 130 S.E.2d 452 (1963); Smith v. Pittston Co., 203 Va. 408,
124 S.E.2d 1 (1962); McCoy v. Lowrie, 42 Wash. 2d 24, 253 P.2d 415 (1953);
Bennett v. Neff, 130 W. Va. 121, 42 S.E.2d 793 (1947); Wallace v. Elm
Grove Coal Co., 58 W. Va. 449, 52 S.E. 485 (1905); Milliron Oil Co. v.
Connaghan, 76 Wyo. 330, 302 P.2d 256 (1956). Dictum to the contrary is
contained in Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Broadhead, 210 Ala. 545 98 So.
789 (1924), but the language was disapproved in Buckelew v. Yawkey, 247
Ala. 304, 24 So. 2d 133 (1945), and recent Alabama cases follow the normal
rule. Baker v. Clark, 128 Cal. 181, 60 Pac. 677 (1900), may hold that certain
acts on the surface constituted adverse possession of severed minerals, but
there had been some mining; it is not clear what acts the court relied upon.2 Arnold v. Stevens, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 106, 35 Am. Dec. 305 (1839),
contains the clearest reasoning on this point of any of the cases cited. This
may demonstrate that old cases are the best.2 7 Ky. BREv. STAT. § 381.430 (1960), which provides that when a "claim-
ant in possession of the surface" has severed minerals, possession of the surface
by him or by those claiming through or under him is "for the benefit" of the
owner of the minerals.
28Ward v. Woods, 310 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1958); Diederich v. Ware, 288
S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1956); Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, 258 Ky. 51, 79 S.W.2d
394 (1934); McPherson v. Thompson, 203 Ky. 35, 261 S.W. 853 (1924);
J. B. Gathright Land Co. v. Begley, 200 Ky. 808, 255 S.W. 837 (1923)(dictum); Farnsworth v. Barret, 146 Ky. 556, 142 S.W. 1049 (1912). See
also Yoss v. Markley, 34 Ohio Ops. 4, 68 N.E.2d 399 (1946), which asserts
the "trust" theory.29 E.g., Diederich v. Ware, supra note 28, where a surface owner who had




Stoebuck: Adverse Possession of Severable Minerals
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1966
1966] ADVERSE POSSESSION OF SEVERABLE MINERALS 281
It frequently happens that the surface owner, in possession of
the surface, will hold instruments giving him colorable title to
minerals as well as surface. The argument may then be made that,
even if possession of the surface is normally not possession of
severed minerals, it becomes such when accompanied by color of
title to them. Apparently the genesis of this argument is in the
doctrine of "constructive possession," a part of the general law of
adverse possession. Under this doctrine, one who does acts of
adverse possession on part of an unsevered tract of land, holding
colorable title to the whole tract, has adverse possession of the
whole.30 This theory cannot avail the possessor of the surface be-
cause, recalling that severance creates what are in legal contem-
plation separate parcels, he has not possession of any part of the
mineral estate. At any rate, the courts uniformly reject the argu-
ment.3'
It is possible, of course, to have adverse possession of the
surface after severance by one not entitled to its possession. Here,
too, the adverse possession does not constitute adverse possession
of the minerals, though the case authority is sparse. 2 Clearly this
is correct, because the surface and mineral estates are legally se-
parate parcels, and possession of the surface is not, without more,
possession of the severed mineral estate.
303 AmmwIcAN LAW OF PnoPERTY 819-20 (1952); 5 THomnsoN, REAL
PnorEnTv 532-33 (1957 Repl. Vol.); 4 Tn-FANY, Rmm PoPERTY 456-59 (3d
ed. 1939).
31 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Dyer, 185 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1950), 8 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 254 (1951), 53 W. VA. L. REv. 72 (1950) (W. Va. law);
Skelly Oil Co. v. Johnson, 209 Ark. 1107, 194 S.W.2d 425 (1946); Grayson-
McLeod Lumber Co. v. Duke, 160 Ark. 76, 254 S.W. 350 (1923); Calvat v.
Juhan, 119 Colo. 561, 206 P.2d 600 (1949); Uphoff v. Trustees of Tufts
College, 351 Ill. 146, 184 N.E. 213 (1932); Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 180
Ill. 398, 54 N.E. 214 (1899); J. R. Crowe Coal & Mining Co. v. Atkinson,
85 Kan. 357, 116 Pac. 499 (1911); Cook v. Farley, 195 Miss. 638, 15 So. 2d
352 (1943); Gill v. Fletcher, 74 Ohio St. 295, 78 N.E. 433 (1906); Deruy
v. Noah, 199 Okla. 230, 185 P.2d 189 (1947); Murray v. Allard, 100 Tenn.
100, 43 S.W. 355 (1897); Lyles v. Dodge, 228 S.W. 316 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921); Wallace v. Elm Grove Coal Co., 58 W. Va. 449, 52 S.E. 485 (1905);
Milliron Oil Co. v. Connaghan 76 Wyo. 330, 302 P.2d 256 (1956).
32 Hunsley v. Valter, 12 IMi. 2d 608, 147 N.E.2d 356 (1958) (dictum);
McBeth v. Wetnight, 57 Ind. App. 47, 106 N.E. 407 (1914) (dictum); Moffett
v. International Paper Co., 243 Miss. 562, 139 So. 2d 655 (1962) (alternate
holding); Toth v. Bigelow, 1 N.J. 399, 64 A.2d 62 (1949) (dictum). See
Brennan v. Pine Hill Collieries Co., 312 Pa. 52, 167 Atl. 776 (1933), 20 VA.
L. RMv. 120 (1933); Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Hughes, 183 Pa. 66, 38
Alt. 568 (1897). Language in most of the cases in note 25, supra, would
support this proposition if considered out of the context of the facts of
those cases.
8
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It follows as a corollary of these rules that to commence adverse
possession of minerals after they have been legally severed, the
disseisor's acts must touch and concern the minerals themselves.
If acts confined to the surface will not suffice for this purpose,
neither will nonuser by the owner of the severed mineral estate.3
Whatever the nature of the severed minerals, be they solid or
fugacious, the disseisor's acts with respect to them must meet the
ordinary test for adverse possession-must be actual, open, notori-
ous, exclusive, continuous and hostile. The elements of claim of
right, color of title or payment of taxes also may be involved. As
previously mentioned, the serious question is not if these aspects of
adverse possession apply, but how they apply, having in mind the
peculiar nature of minerals.
Actual possession. Adverse possession requires some physical
use of the land; in most cases there is permanent occupation,
though in some circumstances this is not necessary. It is sometimes
said the adverse possessor must use the land in the manner an
owner would use similar land under the circumstances. The under-
lying purpose of this requirement is that the owner shall have
notice of the adverse claim, which of course ties into the element
of notoriousness.34 The courts have been reasonably consistent in
applying the principle of "actual possession" to severed minerals.
In the first place, there is no possession of minerals by acts
done in relation to them which do not physically touch them under-
ground. Certainly the mere execution of mineral leases is not such
a touching.3" Neither reputation of ownership36 nor payment of
either general land37 or segregated mineral taxes38 will suffice.
33 Brooke v. Dellinger, 193 Ga. 66, 17 S.E.2d 178 (1941); Arnold v.
Stevens, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 106, 35 Am. Dec. 305 (1839); Marvin v. Brewster
Iron Mining Co., 55 N.Y. 538 (1874); McKelvy v. Wilkinsburg Domestic
Coal Co., 283 Pa. 227, 128 AUt. 830 (1925). The nonuser argument was
mentioned and rejected in a number of the cases cited in note 25, supra.
But in Louisiana, under the statutory doctrine of liberandi causa, it seems a
severed mineral interest may be lost by nonuser. Palmer Corp. v. Moore, 171
La. 774, 132 So. 229 (1930) (dictum). See also McCaw v. Nelson, 168 Ga.
202, 147 S.E. 364 (1929), which holds that a license to mine is lost if not
exercised within a reasonable time.
343 AmEmcAN LAw oF PROPERTY 765 (1952); 5 THOMPSON, REAL
PRoPERTY 516-22 (1957 Repl. Vol.); 4 TnFAY, RFAr PitoPERTY 412-19
(3d ed. 1939).
" Hale v. Horn, 265 Ky. 560, 97 S.W.2d 402 (1936); Smith v. Graf, 259
Ky. 456, 82 S.W.2d 461 (1935); Viersen v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 133 (Okla.
1963); Lyles v. Dodge, 228 S.W. 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921)36 McBeth v. Wetnight, 57 Ind. App. 47, 106 N.E. 407 (1914).3 7 Buckner v. Wright, 218 Ark. 448, 236 S.W.2d 720 (1951); Foss v.
Central Pac. Ry., 9 Cal. App. 2d 117, 49 P.2d 292 (1935).34Barr v. Wall, 265 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
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The acts of "refining some asphalt" on the premises, 9 filling in an
old mineral cut,4" or using for domestic purposes natural gas es-
caping from an abandoned well" have been held not to be pos-
session. Beyond this, it is not every disturbance of the minerals
that will satisfy the requirement. So, the noncommercial taking
of small quantities of coal near the surface for domestic use on
the land or even for use by neighbors in not "substantial" enough
for the purpose." Not even prospecting for ores" nor exploratory
drilling for oil " crosses the threshold of "actual" possession.
The threshold appears to be crossed when mining or drilling
operations take on a commercial nature. Commercial quarries and
gravel pits were held in one case to be possession of stone and
gravel."5 Carrying on commercial mining operations, sometimes
apparently not very large, has constituted sufficient use in several
cases.4" Similarly, the drilling and operation of commercially
productive oil wells is possessory of the oil."7
'" Gilbert v. Lobley, 231 S.W.2d 969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
40 Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 N.Y. 538 (1874).
41 Hassell v. Texaco, Inc., 372 P.2d 233 (Okla. 1962).
41Vance v. Clark, 252 Fed. 495 (4th Cir. 1918) (hand-digging coal for
domestic use for self and neighbors); Vorhes v. Dennison, 300 Ky. 4917 189
S.W.2d 269 (1945); Prewitt v. Bull, 234 Ky. 18, 27 S.W.2d 399 (1930), 19Ky. L.J. 74 (1930); Huss v. Jacobs, 210 Pa. 145, 59 Atd. 991 (1904) (neigh-
bors hauling away surface coal for domestic use).
43Davis v. Federal Land Bank, 219 N.C. 248, 13 S.E.2d 417 (1941) (five
prospecting shafts twenty-five to 135 feet deep and fourteen smaller openings).
44Hiakns v. Keith, 267 Ky. 353, 102 S.W.2d 5 (1936); Lyles v. Dodge,
228 S.W. 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
45 Kinder v. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E. 537
(1923) (alternate holding).
46Pollard v. Simpson, 240 Ala. 401, 199 So. 560 (1940) (unspecified
mining); Lundy v. Lakin, 96 Cal. App. 2d 221, 215 P.2d 61 (1950)(unspecified mining); House v. Palmer, 9 Ga. 497 (1851) (working a mine);
Vance v. Guy, 223 N.C. 409, 27 S.E.2d 117 (1943) (three or four small
mines); Hoilman v. Johnson, 164 N.C. 268, 80 S.E. 249 (1913) (mining mica
at thirty-six openings); Medusa Portland Cement Co. v. Lamantina, 353 Pa.
53, 44 A.2d 244 (1945) ("substantial" drilling, testing and mining); Thomas
v. Young, 93 W. Va. 555, 117 S.E. 909 (1923) (small commercial "country
wagon mine"). Cf., Stephenson v. Wilson, 50 Wis. 95, 6 N.W. 240 (1880)(unspecified "mining operations" adverse possession of unsevered land).
Compare Mitchell v. Mitchell, 303 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1962) ("working and
developing" mining property was possession).
47 Diederich v. Ware, 288 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1956) 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 621(1957), 35 TEXAs L. REv. 455 (1957); Allied Chemical Corp. v. C. E. Kadane
& Sons, 373 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (alternate ground); Lockwood
v. Carter Oil Co., 73 W. Va. 175, 80 S.E. 814 (1913); McElroy, Adverse
Possession of Mineral Estates, 11 BAYL R L. REv. 253, 258 (1959) (citing
mostly Texas cases). Cf., Pewitt v. Renwar Oil Corp., 261 S.W.2d 904 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1953) (maintaining railroad tracks and having producing oil well
adverse possession of unsevered land); Lloyd v. Mills, 68 W. Va. 241, 69
S.E. 1094 (1910) (drilling and operating producing oil wells acts of possession
of unsevered land).
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A wonderfully wild subject is the extent to which one who has
performed possessory acts has "actual" possession of minerals. His
position will be greatly enhanced if he has colorable title to the
tract on which they are located; this aspect will be considered sub-
sequently. Consider now the situation in which the disseisor has
no color of title. He is met by the rule of general adverse posses-
sion law that there is adverse possession only of the area covered
by his acts of actual possession, though a surface possessor will
often be aided by some marked-off boundary, such as a fence or
hedge, particularly if he has maintained it."8 How can a miner
have possession of anything beyond the minerals he already has
taken? The New York case of White v. Miller 9 confronts this
problem and answers that he cannot possess anything beyond the
exposed face. In plain language, this means no adverse possession
is possible, since the mineral when removed is no longer real pro-
perty; thus, the act of removing it, the very act of dominion which
constitutes actual possession, at the same time makes adverse
possession impossible. The result in White is consistent with this
analysis because the court allowed the owner damages for all
minerals removed in the previous six years, apparently on the theory
of trespass. The few other cases that have had the temerity to face
this paradox seem to have reached the same conclusion. 0
There is some tentative authority for saying a miner might gain
actual possession of a block of solid mineral by surrounding it with
tunnels."1 Theoretical support for this authority may be found by
drawing an analogy to a surface adverse possessor who has posses-
sion up to an enclosure fence. Kinder v. La Salle County Carbon
Coal Co., an Illinois case, 2 suggests an extension of this principle
in holding that a claimant who had quarried stone and gravel at
numerous locations had adversely possessed these minerals over
483 AmRcAN LAw OF PRoPFRTY 770-71 (1952); 5 ThoMsoN, REAL
PaopimnY 530-32 (1957 Repl. Vol.); 4 TnrFANY, REAL Posr'mr 456 & 456
n. 90 (3d ed. 1939).
49 78 Misc. 428, 139 N.Y. Supp. 660 (1912) (gypsum mine).
50 Claybrooke v. Barnes, 180 Ark. 678, 22 S.W.2d 390 (1929) (dictum
that there must be possession of "definite area"); Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott,
258 Ky. 51, 79 S.W.2d 394 (1934) (alternate ground); French v. Lansing,
73 Misc. 80, 132 N.Y. Supp. 523 (1911); Blacksburg Mining & Mfg. Co.
v. Bell, 125 Va. 565, 100 S.E. 806 (1919) (alternate ground). Cf., Davis v.
Federal Land Bank, 219 N.C. 248, 13 S.E.2d 417 (1941d (dictum that mining
at various locations on tract is not claim to mineral under entire tract).
51 Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, 258 Ky. 51, 79 S.W.2d 394 (1934)
(dictum); White v. Miller, 78 Misc. 428, 139 N.Y. Supp. 660 (1912) (dictum).
52 310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923). But see Davis v. Federal Land
Bank, supra note 50.
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the entire tract. The celebrated case of Diederich v. Ware53 con-
tains language from which it can be argued that the claimant of
oil and gas would be in a better position than the claimant of
solid minerals. Though the possessor had colorable title to all the
oil, the court leaves the impression that even without it his two
wells might have given a sort of constructive possession under the
entire tract of fifty-six acres because they drained a pool under-
lying the whole area. At least with fugacious minerals, it can be
maintained at the theoretical level that a dominion of sorts is exer-
cised over the pool which is drained, giving "possession" to the
boundaries of the tract if the pool extends that far. Even with
solid minerals the argument might be made that a miner has
dominion over a quantity of minerals sufficient reasonably to sup-
port his current operations, but this leads to a serious question of
how far this would go. In the present state of authorities, it is,
for practical purposes, nigh impossible to have any adverse pos-
session of severed minerals without color of title; perhaps some
imaginative thinking needs to be done here.
The adverse possessor's hand is greatly strengthened when he
has color of title to the minerals under the entire tract. In the
general law of adverse possession colorable title, by the doctrine
of "constructive possession," extends physical possession of part
of a tract to the boundaries described in the colorable instrument.
5 4
This same doctrine is applied to the adverse possession of severed
minerals, both solid and fugacious. Therefore, if the claimant has
conducted on some part of the tract acts of "actual" possession, as
previously described, and if he has color of title to the entire
tract, both surface and minerals or minerals alone, his adverse
possession is of all minerals described in the colorable instrument
to the boundaries it sets out." In practice, nearly all the cases
in which the adverse mineral possessor has prevailed have been
ones in which he has color of title.
3288 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1956), 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 621 (1957), 35
TExAs L. REv. 455 (1957).
543 AmEmCAN LAw OF PRoPERTY 819-20 (1952); 5 THomPsoN, REAL
Pitop, ax 532-33 (1957 RepI. Vol.); 4 TIFrANv, REAL PROPERTY 456-59 (3d
ed. 1939).
55Lundy v. Lakin, 96 Cal. App. 2d 221, 215 P.2d 61 (1950); O'Reilly
v. Balkwill, 133 Colo. 474, 297 P.2d 263 (1956); Diederich v. Ware, supra
note 47; Couch v. Armory Comm'n, 91 Misc. 445, 154 N.Y. Supp. 945 (1915);
Vance v. Guy, 223 N.C. 409, 27 S.E.2d 117 (1943); Allied Chemical Corp.
v. G. E. Kadane & Sons, 373 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (alternate
holding); Blacksburg Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Bell, 125 Va. 565, 100 S.E. 806
12
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Open and notorious. Another requirement for adverse possession
is that it be "open"' or "visible" and "notorious." The purpose here is
quite plainly that the disseisor shall leave a visible "trail" on the
land, by means of which the owner could, by reasonable diligence,
take notice of the disseisin.56 In seeking to apply these principles
to severed minerals, it is obvious that the mineral owner, not being
a mole, can have knowledge of exploitation of his minerals only
by surface features which bespeak underground use. Few cases
specifically discuss notoriousness, but it must require such objects
as mine entries, oil derricks or pumps, pits or structures associated
with removal of minerals.57
Occasionally the question has arisen whether the mineral owner
has notice of the adverse use when mining tunnels under his
land are entered from adjoining land or when his oil pool is drained
by an adjoining well.58 There should be no notice in these situations
unless the mineral owner has actual knowledge of the possessory
acts against his minerals. He should not be chargeable with taking
notice of acts on any but the land under which his minerals lie.
Suppose there are acts sufficient to constitute adverse possession
of one mineral, say, coal. Will this be notice of a claim to other
minerals? One case holds yes,59 another, no. 60 A realistic solution
that has been suggested" is that it should be notice to the person
(1919) (dictum); Thomas v. Young, 93 W. Va. 555 117 S.E. 909 (1923).
Cf., Kilpatrick v. Gulf Prod. Co., 139 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940);
Stephenson v. Wilson, 50 Wis. 95, 6 N.W. 240 (1880). Contra, Sanford v.
Alabama Power Co., 256 Ala. 280, 54 So. 2d 562 (1951). See generally on
this subject Lee, Working Part of a Mineral Estate as Adverse Possession of
the Whole, 46 Ky. L.J. 67 (1957).
563 A.msruc. LAW OF PROPERTY 768-70 (1952); 6 POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY 712-15 (1958); 5 THOmPSON, RrAL PRoPERTY 535-39 (1957 Repl.
Vol.); 4 TIFFANY, REAL PR PERTY 419-21 (3d ed. 1939).5 7 Kinder v. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 M11. 126, 141 N.E.
537 (1923). See also Costello v. Muhein, 9 Ariz. 422, 84 Pac. 906 (1906)
(extending small mine shaft from six to ten feet in depth not "visible"). The
cases cited in notes 46 and 47, supra, by implication hold that mine entries and
oil denicks or pumps are features giving notice.58 Brizzolara v. Powell, 214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W.2d 728 (1949) (oil well on
adjoining land not notice); Stark v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 241 Pa. 597, 88
Atl. 770 (1913) (driving mine tunnel from shaft and entry on ad'oining
land not notorious); Thomas v. Young, 93 W. Va. 555, 117 S.E. 909 (1923)
(mine shafts running from entry on adjoining land held to give notice; dubious
unless owner had actual notice).59 Hoilman v. Johnson, 164 N.C. 268, 80 S.E. 249 (1913).6oKentucky Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Sewell, 249 Fed. 840 (6th Cir.
1918).
61 Williams & Meyers, Adverse Possession and Trespass in the Law of Oil
and Gas, 29 Rocky MT. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1956).
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owning the one mineral actually exploited, so as to give adverse
possession of all minerals he owns. If, by virtue of multiple sever-
ances, part of the minerals were owned by other persons, there
would be no adverse possession of them.
Exclusive. Unless the adverse claimant has exclusive possession
of the land, there is no adverse possession. He cannot share posses-
sion with either the owner or with others, for the reason that legal
possession is by definition exclusive.6" According to one case,
Woodside v. Ciceroni,63 the same element of exclusiveness applies
to adverse possession of minerals, so that during the period of
limitations the adverse claimant must have solitary use of the
minerals upon the tract in question. It could hardly be otherwise.
Continuous. Acts, otherwise sufficient to constitute adverse pos-
session, must be carried on "continuously" for the period of limita-
tions. In some contexts, as where land is devoted to crops, this
may not mean fresh acts on the land every day, but it must mean at
least that the owner has a possessory cause of action at all times."
The issue is essentially one of fact. Because the mining of solid
minerals is apt to be seasonal by nature, especially with small-
scale operations, the requirement of continuousness raises close
questions.
Mining operations must be spread over the entire period of
limitations but do not necessarily have to be carried on every day
or perhaps even every month. About the best that can be said is
that mining meets the minimum requirements if carried on, "con-
tinuously at such seasons as the nature of the business and the
customs of the country permit or require."" Operations having
less continuity are labeled "occasional" or "from time to time" and
62 5 THOmPSON, REAL PoPPERTY 540-42 (1957 Repl. Vol.); 4 Tni'ANY,
REAL PRoPERTY 421-24 (3d ed. 1939).
63 93 Fed. 1 (9th Cir. 1899) (adverse claimant's mineral prospecting
not exclusive when owner and others also prospected).
643 AmRICAN LAw oF PROPERTY 806-07 (1952); 5 THoMSON, REAL
PROPERTY 558-62 (1957 Repl. Vol.); 4 T='ANY, REAL PRoPERTY 433-34 (3d
ed. 1939).65 Pollard v. Simpson, 240 Ala. 401, 199 So. 560, 562 (1940). Accord,
Gordon v. Park, 219 Mo. 600, 117 S.W. 1163 (1909) (dictum similar to
language quoted in text); Hoilman v. Johnson, 164 N.C. 268, 80 S.E. 249(1913) (farmer who owned surface mined as he had time in customary fall
and winter season); Medusa Portland Cement Co. v. Lamantina, 353 Pa.
53, 44 A.2d 244 (1945) (need not be "every day"); Thomas v. Young, 93
W. Va. 555, 117 S.E. 909 (1923) (mining twenty days per month for eight
months per year).
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do not suffice.66 Some acts held not to have been "continuous"
are mining small quantities of coal during winter months,"7 re-
moving forty to forty-five carloads of loose stone over a ten to
twelve-year period, 8 and "some" surface mining for short periods
every three or four months.69 The opinions evince a certain amount
of yawing about in this area, and one suspects that acts to which
a given court attaches the epithet "occasional," another court might
regard as being continuous during customary mining seasons.
Hostile. "Hostility" of adverse possession means that the pos-
sessor must not be in by permission of the owner nor in recognition
of his right. It is generally found from the character of possession,
bolstered perhaps by the possessor's declarations.7" The application
of this concept to severed minerals seems much the same as to un-
severed estates. No hostility exists if the possessor is a lessee' or
licensee72 of the mineral owner. There may even be a presump-
tion that certain minor interferences with minerals, such as digging
small amounts of surface coal for domestic use, are permissive,
particularly if persons customarily so conduct themselves.7 3 This
of course rapidly shades into the rule that temporary trespasses are
not dispossession of the owner.
Most of the "hostility" cases involve alleged adverse possession
between parties who are co-tenants in the minerals. Since co-
tenants each have the right to use and enjoy all parts of the land,
there is nothing in the exclusive possession of one that implies ad-
66 Uphoff v. Trustees of Tufts College, 351 IMI. 146, 184 N.E. 213 (1932);
Ward v. Woods, 310 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1958) ("time to time"); Piney Oil & Gas
Co. v. Scott, 258 Ky. 51, 79 S.W.2d 394 (1934); Vorhes v. Dennison, 300 Ky.
427, 189 S.W.2d 269 (1945); Davis v. Federal Land Bank, 219 N.C. 248,
13 S.E.2d 417 (1941); Central Trust Co. v. Harless, 108 W. Va. 618, 152 S.E.
209 (1930) ("time to time").6 7 Prewitt v. Bull, 234 Ky. 18, 27 S.W.2d 399 (1930), 19 Ky. L.J. 74.
6
8 Campbell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 150 Tenn. 423, 265
S.W. 674 (1924).
69 Claybrooke v. Barnes, 180 Ark. 678, 22 S.W.2d 390 (1929).
713 Ammuc LAw oi PRoPERTY 772-73 (1952); 5 TnompsoN, RE:AL
PROPERTY 542-45 (1957 Repl. Vol.); 4 Tni-xvy, REAL P1oPERTY 424-30 (3d
ed. 1939).
71 Original Consol. Mining Co. v. Abbott, 167 Fed. 681 (D. Mont. 1908)
(tenant at will occupying surface cannot adversely possess unsevered minerals);
Putnam v. Fisher, 128 W. Va. 383, 36 S.E.2d 681 (1945) (mineral lessee
cannot possess adversely; alternate ground).
72 Desloge v. Pearce, 38 Mo. 588 (1866).
•Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Scott, 258 Ky. 51, 79 S.W.2d 394 (1934) (hand-
digging coal from exposed veins for use of surface owner and neighbors);
Ventro v. Clincbfield Coal Corp., 199 Va. 943, 103 S.E.2d 254 (1958)(hand-mining coal for use of surface owner and neighbors).
[Vol. 68
15
Stoebuck: Adverse Possession of Severable Minerals
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1966
1966] ADVERSE POSSESSION OF SEVERABLE MINERALS 289
versity or hostility to the others without something more being
shown. The "something more," called an "ouster," must be some-
thing calculated to give the others notice that their fellow now
claims the whole estate for himself. Obviously, his writing them a
letter denying their interest would be such notice. 4 More fre-
quently an ouster occurs when one co-tenant purports to convey
all the minerals to one who goes into possession under the convey-
ance. 5 On the other side, one co-tenant's payment of the full
real estate taxes on the minerals is not an ouster.7 6 Neither is one
tenant's using and allowing others to take coal,"' nor is possession
of the surface alone by one who owns the surface and who also is
a co-tenant of severed minerals.7 8
Color of title and claim of right. Colorable title is the status
that appears to flow from a document that seems to give title but
does not, owing to some defect. Normally the defect is extrinsic
to the document, as the inability of a grantor to convey title. The
instrument must describe the land correctly and generally must be
fair on its face, though some courts have allowed defects on the
face if they would not be apparent to a legally untrained person."
With minerals the usual document is a deed purportedly grant-
ing8 ° or excepting8' severed minerals or seeming to convey the
7 4 Allied Chemical Corp. v. G. E. Kadane & Sons, 373 S.W.2d 778 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1963).
7 Couch v. Armory Commn, 91 Misc. 445, 154 N.Y. Supp. 945 (1915);
Medusa Portland Cement Co. v. Lamantina, 353 Pa. 53, 44 A.2d 244 (1945)
(alternate ground); Smith v. Kingsley, 331 Pa. 10, 200 Ad. 11 (1938) (one
hundred year lease; court says short-term lease probably not ouster). But of.
Powell v. Johnson, 170 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), which holds that
attempted conveyance of a fractional share larger than the co-tenant owned
was not an ouster, though the court said a purported conveyance of all
minerals would be.7 6 Hoagland v. Fish, 238 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1951).7 7Cark v. Beard, 69W . Va. 313, 71 S.E. 188 (1911).
78 Moragne v. Doe, 143 Ala. 459, 39 So. 161 (1904); Foss v. Central
Pac. Ry., 9 Cal. App. 2d 117, 49 P.2d 292 (1935); Pan Mut. Royalties v.
William , 365 P.2d 138 (Okla. 1961). Of course the surface owner's possession
of only the surface falls short of adverse possession of severed minerals in
other respects; for one, it is not actual possession of minerals.
793 AmxucAN LAW OiF PRoPErTY 785 (1952); 5 ThomrsON, REAL
Pmor, m 552-56 (1957 Repl. Vol.); 4 TrsrFuNr, BRi.PROPERTY 459-62 (3d
ed. 1939).810E.g., Diederich v. Ware, 288 S.W.2d 643 (Ky. 1956), 32 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 621 (1957), 35 Trx~s L. REv. 455 (1957); Kilpatrick v. Gulf Prod.
Co., 139 S.W. 2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
81 E.g., Sanford v. Alabama Power Co., 256 Ala. 280, 54 So. 2d 562
(1951) (though stating there was colorable title, court held there was no ad-
verse possession).
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parcel as unsevered land.82 A void land patent83 or void tax deed8 '
are other examples. The consequences that come from having color-
able title to minerals have been discussed previously.8"
Adverse possession cases sometimes assert that the disseisor's
possession must be under a "claim of right" or "claim of title."
This generally is understood as a restatement of the element of
"hostility"; i.e., that he possesses in his own right and not by the
owner's permission. However, occasional cases carry the notion
further, leading to intricate questions of the effect of the posses-
sor's subjective intent to, or not to, possess against the owner.
Whether subjective intent should be a factor is one of the per-
sistent, basic, sophisticated running arguments in the study of
adverse possession. Some of the mineral cases mention "claim
of right,"" but in no case cited in this article has anything seemed
to turn on it.
Payment of taxes. Some adverse possession statutes, usually with
relatively short limitations periods, require, among other elements,
the payment of taxes on the land claimed. In applying such
statutes to adverse claims to mineral interests, a group of cases has
held the mineral claimant does not put himself within the statute
by paying taxes segregated to the surface88 nor even by paying
general taxes that, through the assessor's oversight, have not been
segregated.89 The reasoning seems to be that, after a mineral
82 E.g., Lundy v. Lakin, 96 Cal. App. 2d 221, 215 P.2d 61 (1950);
Uphoff v. Trustees of Tufts College, 351 IM. 146, 184 N.E. 213 (1932);
Couch v. Armory Comm'n, 91 Misc. 445, 154 N.Y. Supp. 945 (1915); Thomas
v. Young, 93 W. Va. 555, 117 S.E. 909 (1923).
83 Hellier Coal & Coke Co. v. Bowling, 272 S.W.2d 651 (Ky. 1954).84 Catlin Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 180 Ill. 398, 54 N.E. 214 (1899).
81 See notes 30 and 31, supra, and their textual referents for discussion of
the rule that, when actual possession is of the surface only, color of title
to minerals is not possession of them. For a discussion of the doctrine of
constructive possession, see notes 54 and 55, supra, and the accompanying
text.
86 For a general discussion of "claim of right" and an indoctrination in
the nning argument, see 3 AmmucAN LAW OF PROPERTY 773-85 (1952)
("claim of right" should mean nothing more than "hostile"); 5 THomPsON,
REAL PROPERTY 548-51 (1957 Repl. Vol.) ("better rule" is that subjective
intent is required); 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 441-46 (3d ed. 1939) (fairly
neutral but may lean toward view it means only "hostile').
87 E.g., McBeth v. Wetnight, 57 Ind. App. 47, 106 N.E. 407 (1914);
White v. Miller, 78 Misc. 428, 139 N.Y. Supp. 660 (1912); Hassell v. Texaco,
Inc., 372 P.2d 233 (1962).88 Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 152 Pac. 178 (1915).
8" Jones v. Brown, 211 Ark. 164, 199 S.W.2d 973 (1947); Uphoff v.
Trustees of Tufts College, 351 IMl. 146, 184 N.E. 213 (19325 (alternate
ground); Yoss v. Marldey, 34 Ohio Ops. 4, 68 N.E.2d 399 (1946 (alternate
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severance, unsegregated taxes are regarded as being assessed
against the surface.
A few states have statutes giving title to vacant land to one who,
having colorable title, has paid taxes for a specified number of
years. No possession, adverse or otherwise, is required. Arkansas,
whose statute pertains to "wild and uninclosed land," has deter-
mined that the statute has no application to severed mineral in-
terests, which are not within the meaning of its language.9" This
seems sensible because such statutes were devised to provide a
means of acquiring title to areas, such as inaccessible mountain
lands, which are not capable of being adversely possessed.
A PARTING THouGHT
Adverse possessors seldom set out purposefully to gain title
to another's land. Sometimes they are mistaken, as when a bound-
ary has become lost. But in adverse possession of minerals the mis-
take is typically that of a surface owner who genuinely believes, on
the basis of colorable title, that he has title to the minerals. For
him, assertion of an adverse possession theory is simply an ex-
pedient for preserving that to which he supposed he had title and
for which he gave something of value. Had he and the record
owner of the minerals known of each other's interest from the
beginning, no problem would have arisen.
So it is that in most cases the adverse possession problem has
its inception in someone's losing track of the severed mineral in-
terests. If conveyancers can prevent this happening, most of the
adverse possession litigation can be averted. What, practically,
can be done?
Suppose the mineral severance occurs by exception, or as it is
popularly called, "reservation." The original owner of unsevered
land conveys it and in the deed excepts the minerals. It should be
clear to the grantee that he does not own the minerals, but what
about the grantor or those who administer his estate? It would be
clearer to them if the grantor had a mineral deed running back to
him. To accomplish this, he might convey the unsevered land to
90 Brizzolara v. Powell, 214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W.2d 728 (1949). Compare
McCoy v. Lowrie, supra note 89, which assumed arguendo such a statute
did apply to minerals, and then held on other grounds there was no adverse
possession.
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the grantee and, as part of the same transaction, take back a deed
to the minerals. Perhaps better yet, he might give a deed excepting
the minerals and take back a mineral quit claim deed. The deed
back would pass nothing, of course-that was not the reason for it-
but it would give the grantor an instrument to record and to place
among his valuable papers, calling attention to the fact he owned
severed minerals.
Consider now the situation in which the mineral severance is by
a deed conveying only the minerals. Here, too, it would be wise
for the grantor to take back a quit claim deed-this time for the
surface alone. It probably should contain a recital that he has
conveyed the minerals. This will give him an original, incoming
instrument, reminding those who find it among his papers of the
nature of his interest. Like the deeds recommended in the preced-
ing paragraph, it should be recorded.
A number of adverse possession suits may be traced to the prac-
tice of using a "blanket' quit claim deed to convey a previously
severed surface or mineral interest. That is to say, the owner of
one of the interests gives a quit claim deed, not limited to his
severed interest, but describing the property as though it were
unsevered. No competent draftsman should ever do this. True,
it conveys no more than the grantor has, but it commences a delu-
sive and colorable chain of title to the other interest.
No amount of careful drafting will prevent all adverse posses-
sion problems. If the advice is trite, it is valuable enough to bear
repeating that there is no substitute for title searches and at least
periodic physical inspection of the land.
[Vol. 68
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